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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Using data from 144 village-level governments in 
India’s Tamil Nadu state, this paper investigates political 
reservations for women and whether the gender of village 
government leaders influences the provision of village 
public goods. A knowledge test of village government 
presidents and a survey about the interaction between 
village presidents and higher-level officials reveal that 
female village government presidents have much lower 
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knowledge of the village government system than do their 
male counterparts and have significantly less contact with 
higher-level government officials. Although male and 
female presidents provide similar amounts of some public 
goods, there is strong evidence that village governments 
led by a woman built fewer schools and roads—two 
public goods that require relatively more contact and 
coordination with higher-level officials.  
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The role of women in developing country governance has received much attention in 
recent years.  Today, 57 countries have quotas for women specified in their constitution or in 
national legislation; this figure increases to 94 when including countries with voluntary political 
party quotas.1  Gender equality is also one of the eight Millennium Development Goals, and the 
World Bank has put gender empowerment high on their agenda, stating that gender inequality 
hinders development and poverty reduction (World Bank 2001).  
One key motivation for the reservation of government seats for women is to address the 
exceptionally poor status of women in developing countries.  Among the poorest individuals in 
the developing world, women are particularly worse off in terms of health, income, job 
opportunities, rights, and political representation.  Political reservations are one way to attempt to 
improve the status of women in society and ensure their participation in government.  Women’s 
well-being also affects others, especially their children.  Political reservations thus also aim to 
lead to more pro-women policies, which may include pro-child, pro-family, and pro-health 
policies.  Understanding the performance of women who hold reserved seats, therefore, becomes 
of utmost importance.  To this end, we investigate women’s political reservations in village 
governments in India’s Tamil Nadu state and whether the gender of political leaders influences 
public goods provision. 
The impact of women’s reservation policies has been hotly contested in both policy and 
academic arenas, largely because of a lack of counterfactuals.  India’s large-scale political 
reservations provide an excellent setting for evaluating the impact of reservation policies; the 
1 From the database at http://www.quotaproject.org.  These statistics include countries with quotas at national or 
sub-national levels.  Political party quotas are only used in places with a proportional representation system, as 
opposed to first-past-the-post.  These figures do not account for non-compliance issues. 
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evidence, however, is mixed.2  Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) undertake, to our knowledge, 
the first major attempt to empirically analyze the effect of women politicians in India by 
exploiting the randomness some Indian states use in implementing reservation policies.  Using 
data on female presidents and public goods provision in village level governments (called gram 
panchayats, henceforth GPs) combined with data on women’s preferences, the authors show that 
female GP presidents (known as pradhans in some states) in women-reserved seats invest more 
in public goods considered important by women, such as drinking water and roads in West 
Bengali GPs and drinking water in Rajasthani GPs.  Duflo and Topalova (2004) find a positive 
impact on public goods provision in women-headed GPs; however, they also find that citizens in 
GPs with women presidents are generally more dissatisfied with public goods provision and 
perceive these women to be ineffective leaders.3  In their empirical analysis of West Bengal’s 
GPs, Beaman et al. (2009) provide evidence that this ‘perception bias’ fades over time with 
repeated exposure to female leaders.  They additionally find evidence that GPs with prior female 
president reservations have significantly more women in unreserved GP-level elected seats, 
suggesting that reservations may improve the electoral potential of women.  Beaman et al. (2010) 
build on each of these three papers by examining villages in West Bengal over an additional GP 
election cycle as well as a panel of 11 Indian states.  They confirm the main findings of these 
papers in addition to showing that women GP presidents from Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) 
perform even better over time: in the second election cycle analyzed, women presidents engaged 
in more repairs of schools and health centers and investments in irrigation facilities.  In the 11 
states overall, they find that women perform better for some public goods.  However, they do not 
2 Mansuri and Rao (2013) provide an excellent discussion of the literature on women’s political reservations—
particularly in India—and their impacts on participation in government as well as public goods provision. 
3 Duflo and Topalova (2004) assume that reservations at the GP level are randomly assigned in all states in their 
analysis.  However, many states—including states in their sample—use population ratios to assign reservations. 
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report how this varies across states.  Village citizens might also be impacted by a role model 
effect of women GP presidents: Beaman et al. (2012) identify a shrinking gender gap between 
boys’ and girls’ aspirations, as well as parents’ aspirations for their sons and daughters, in GPs 
reserved for women for two election cycles in one district in West Bengal.  
In contrast, Ban and Rao (2008) examine four states in southern India and find that 
female presidents do not provide public goods in line with their preferences, nor do they provide 
fewer public goods than men.  Rajaraman and Gupta (2012) show that GP expenditures on 
water-related issues (a women-preferred public good, as found in some previous studies) are 
unaffected by the GP president’s gender but are significantly higher in GPs with characteristics 
associated with more water-borne diseases outbreaks.  Bardhan et al. (2005) find mixed results in 
West Bengal regarding the impact of women GP president reservations on program targeting by 
the GP: women in reserved seats do better in bringing IRDP credit programs to the poor4 but fare 
worse regarding employment programs, construction of new concrete roads, and raising non-tax 
revenue.  Although Bardhan et al. (2005) cite the difficulty in aggregating these results into an 
overall impact on welfare, they estimate that women-reserved GPs may be worse off in terms of 
targeting the poor because the gains from improved IRDP targeting are more than offset by the 
losses from worse employment-program targeting.  Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe 
(ST) households in women-reserved GPs are particularly negatively affected, and this effect is 
worse in GPs with higher land inequality among SC and ST households.  Using the same set of 
West Bengali GPs as Bardhan et al. (2005) but in a later time period (1998–2004), Bardhan et al. 
(2010) find no evidence of improved targeting to the poor in female-reserved GPs.  They do find 
a negative effect of women’s reservation on targeting to SC and ST households; however, in 
4 IRDP (Integrated Rural Development Programme) credit is an Indian government program that gives poor rural 
families access to credit and/or skills training so they can engage in income-generating activities. 
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contrast to their previous study, the negative impact of women in reserved GPs on poorer 
targeting to SC and ST households is lessened in GPs with higher land inequality.  Ban and Rao 
(2008) and Beaman et al. (2010) find lower job-related knowledge among women GP presidents.  
However, the disparity between men and women presidents in Beaman et al. (2010) disappears 
two years into their term in office.  Clearly, the empirical findings on the impact of women’s GP 
reservations are mixed.    
In this paper, we investigate public goods provision by male and female GP presidents in 
Tamil Nadu.  Although the methodology of this paper is similar to that of Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo (2004) and Ban and Rao (2008), we contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of 
women in India’s village governments by building on previous work5 in the following ways.  (1) 
We analyze the results of a knowledge test of GP rules and regulations, given to GP presidents in 
the fourth year of their presidency.6  (2) We incorporate data on the frequency of interaction 
between GP presidents and key individuals in other tiers of sub-state governance in Tamil Nadu 
to understand the extent of women GP presidents’ activity and connections while holding office.7  
(3) We discuss important differences in the history of local governance in India’s states, which 
may explain why our findings differ from some previous findings, particularly in West Bengal.  
Context is extremely important in examining women’s reservations, and findings in one area 
cannot be assumed to hold in other areas.  (4) We develop a detailed village-level dataset for two 
time periods using village-level government records instead of recall data on public goods, as in 
some previous studies.  This allows for a more precise difference-in-differences (DID) analysis.  
5 We focus on the literature examining decentralized governance in India. There are numerous analyses of 
decentralization and public goods provision in other countries. See, for example, Zhang and Zhou (1998), Faguet 
(2004), and Zhang et al. (2004). 
6 Our knowledge test questions focus on GP functioning and panchayat rules and thus differ from the knowledge 
assessments in Ban and Rao (2008) and Beaman et al. (2010). 
7 In assessing interaction with higher-level officials, Ban and Rao (2008) use only a binary measure of whether a GP 
president has met with any higher panchayat official. 
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We also use several outcome variables to measure public goods provision by the GP, allowing us 
to check the robustness of our results.  
We find that female GP presidents are much less knowledgeable than are male presidents 
regarding the GP president position and the Panchayat system in general.  Additionally, female 
presidents have significantly less contact with higher-level government officials vis-à-vis their 
male counterparts.  This is important because contact and coordination with higher-level officials 
is necessary for certain village public goods.  The results of our analysis strongly suggest that 
female presidents provide their GPs with fewer schools and roads, two public goods that require 
more connection with higher-level officials in the panchayat system.  To the best of our 
knowledge, these results are new in the literature.  We also find weak evidence that women 
provide fewer household toilet connections, household drinking water connections, and 
streetlights.  For all other public goods, there is generally no statistically significant difference 
between provision by male and female presidents.  Given the low level of public goods and 
infrastructure in these GPs, we consider more public goods provision to be indicative of “better” 
performance as a GP president.  
In the next section, we briefly review the history of local governance in India, specifically 
in Tamil Nadu.  We describe our field survey in Section II and our empirical strategy in Section 
III.  In Section IV, we analyze the performance of female presidents and estimate the effect of 
president gender on village public goods provision.  In the final two sections, we discuss our 
findings and offer some concluding thoughts. 
I. Setting 
Self-governing village communities in India seem to have existed since two to three 
thousand years ago (Mathew 2000b).  Village governance weakened during British rule in India 
6 
 
but then strengthened following independence in 1947, motivated by Gandhi’s vision of strong 
decentralized governments.8  Although some form of local governance existed in many states, 
the structure, duties, reservation policies, and consistency of elections varied widely across states.  
Uniformity of decentralization across states was largely advanced in the early 1990s through the 
73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments.  The 73rd Amendment, which focuses on 
decentralization in rural areas,9 required the creation of three tiers of sub-state governance—
called panchayats—at the district, block (or union), and village levels in each of India’s 28 
states.10  The 73rd Amendment notably calls for the reservation of seats at all levels of 
panchayats for women, Scheduled Caste (SC), and Scheduled Tribe (ST) persons.11   
Village panchayats, known as gram panchayats (GPs), have recently received much 
attention in the literature due to their use of political reservations.  A minimum of one-third of 
GP presidents’ seats within each state must be reserved for women, and another portion is 
reserved for SC and ST persons based on the composition of SC and ST persons within the state.  
These mandatory reservations are well suited for empirically analyzing the role of GPs in public 
goods provision and the extent of influence of the GP president. 12 
Our study focuses on Tamil Nadu, India’s southernmost state.  Tamil Nadu was 
originally part of the Madras State after India’s independence and became present-day Tamil 
Nadu in 1968.  Aram and Palanithurai (2000) provide a summary of the rich history of local 
8 For a brief history of local governments in each of India’s states, see Mathew (2000a). 
9 The 74th Amendment applies to municipalities. 
10 India’s seven Union Territories are headed by a federal government-appointed administrator. 
11 “Scheduled Caste” refers to persons historically found at the bottom of India’s caste system of social hierarchy, 
formerly referred to as “Untouchables.” 
12 Reservation of seats for women, SC, and ST persons is required for all elected positions in the three tiers of 
panchayats; we focus solely on the position of GP president. 
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governance in Tamil Nadu.13 During the peak of the Chola Dynasty (roughly 900–1200 AD), 
villages were strong, self-governing units.  Local governance was also reasonably strong during 
the colonial period, though it weakened in the final years before independence.  Through the 
Madras Panchayat Act of 1958, local governance strengthened, and Tamil Nadu was a panchayat 
success story.  However, from the 1970s to the mid-1980, things were in flux.  After the passage 
of India’s 73rd Constitutional Amendment, Tamil Nadu created the 1994 Tamil Nadu 
Panchayats Act, which included women’s reservations.  Its first post-Act panchayat elections 
were held in 1996 and have since been held every five years.  
The 73rd Amendment outlines 29 areas that can be allocated to the GP; each state then 
chooses which areas it will devolve.  The Amendment also sets requirements on the reservation 
of seats, but each state can implement this in its own way.  In Tamil Nadu, the Rural 
Development and Panchayati Raj Department of the Government of Tamil Nadu is responsible 
for the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Acts of 1994 as well as many other documents and government 
orders outlining the rules of the panchayat system and what is devolved to the GP.14  GP 
reservations in Tamil Nadu are held for 10 years (two five-year election terms), and the selection 
of GPs for reservation—for women, SC, and ST persons—is performed at the block level.  Tamil 
Nadu, similar to many Indian states, does not randomly select GPs for women, SC, and ST 
reservations.  For the 1996 elections (the first elections following the Tamil Nadu Panchayats 
Act), one-third of GPs in each block were reserved for women, and 20 percent were reserved for 
SC and ST presidents.  Reserved GPs are chosen as follows: 
13 All historical information about Tamil Nadu’s governance in this paragraph comes from Aram and Palanithurai 
(2000). 
14 Some documents are available on the Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department website: 
http://www.tnrd.gov.in/acts_go.html.  Many, however, are not.  We obtained some documents from our field 
contacts to help in understanding the devolution of power and responsibility to GP presidents in Tamil Nadu.   
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1. All GPs within a block are arranged in descending order of the ratio of SC persons to the 
total population.  The top 20 percent are set aside for SC and ST reservations. 
2. If the ST population in a block is above a certain level, one GP is reserved for an ST 
president.  If not, all SC and ST reservations chosen in part (1) are set for SC 
reservation.15 
3. The GPs in the 20 percent reserved for SC/ST reservations are arranged in descending 
order of the ratio of female SC persons to the total SC population.  The top one-third is 
reserved for female SC presidents. 
4. The remaining GPs are sorted in descending order of the ratio of females to the total 
population.  The top one-third is reserved for female presidents.  
5. All reservations are held for 10 years (two terms).  After 10 years, the same procedure is 
implemented, except that GPs previously reserved for SC and ST presidents are excluded 
from step (1), and GPs previously reserved for women are excluded from step (4). 
 
Given this reservation method, a regression discontinuity (RD) approach would be ideal 
for identifying the effect of reservations on differences in public goods provision.  However, 
based on the available data, an RD analysis requires that we omit all GPs with an SC reservation, 
resulting in a significant loss in observations, especially because the analysis is conducted within 
a small bandwidth of the discontinuity.  Thus, we use RD only as a check of our key findings. 
Although the assignment of reservations in Tamil Nadu is not random, we believe that 
women’s reservations are not related to any unobservable determinants of public goods provision 
on the following grounds: (i) the female-to-total population ratio is extremely similar across GPs 
15 No GPs in our sample were selected for ST reservation.  Tamil Nadu’s very small ST population means that very 
few GPs in Tamil Nadu are selected for ST reservation overall. 
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within each block (Table 1); (ii) GPs selected for female reservation do not differ significantly 
from non-reserved GPs in a number of village attributes (Table 2, first three columns);16 (iii) the 
female-to-total population ratio is uncorrelated with any village characteristics for which we 
have data (Table S1.1 in the supplemental appendix); and (iv) a t-test of the difference in mean 
public goods levels in 1991 (before reservation assignments were made) shows that GPs selected 
for female reservation in 1996 did not differ significantly from unreserved GPs in most of the 11 
public goods measures used in this analysis (Table 3).  Reserved GPs did have fewer public 
toilets; however, we do not feel that this affects our main findings.  Because we use a DID 
approach to estimate the effect of women’s GP reservations, even if unobservable factors exist 
that influence a GP’s reservation status and affect public goods provision, our estimate of the 
effect of reservation on public goods provision will be unbiased as long as those factors do not 
change over time.  We discuss this further in Sections III and IV.   
II. Data 
The data for this study come from village government records and village-level surveys 
conducted in Tamil Nadu in 2005 and 2006, implemented through a joint research project of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Tamil Nadu Agricultural University 
(TNAU).17  Tamil Nadu has 29 district panchayats (DPs), 385 panchayat union councils (PUCs), 
and 12,618 GPs in total.  To select GPs for our survey, we divided the districts of Tamil Nadu 
into three categories based on their Human Development Index: Developed, Moderately 
Developed, and Less Developed.  We randomly selected one district from each of the three 
16 There is one exception: the number of Christian households is significantly greater in unreserved villages. 
However, Christian households comprise less than two percent of total households in our sample, so we are not 
concerned with this difference.   
17 We also used election data posted by the Tamil Nadu State Election Commission to verify the reservation status of 
GPs in our study (http://tnsec.tn.nic.in). 
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human development categories, from which four PUCs were randomly chosen.  From each of the 
12 PUCs, we randomly selected 12 GPs, for a total of 144 GPs from 12 PUCs from three districts.  
The three districts from which the 144 GPs for this survey were selected are Coimbatore, 
Pudukottai, and Vellore.   
Data were collected using several surveys.  For this analysis, the data come from 
individual interviews with each GP president, interviews with 270 randomly selected citizens, 
and a secondary data schedule used to gather current and historic data on GP characteristics and 
levels of public goods.  Summary statistics for all data are given in Tables 4a and 4b. 
III. Empirical Strategy 
This study aims to examine the treatment effect of reserving the GP president’s position 
for women by comparing reserved and unreserved GPs.  However, because we can never observe 
a reserved GP in the absence of a reservation,  estimates of the effect of reservations can be 
biased.  Additionally, one may be concerned about the use of GP female-population ratios to 
determine women’s reserved seats.  One technique to control for potential bias caused by 
unobservable factors is a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation strategy.  
 DID estimation uses a control group and an experimental group and observations in at 
least two time periods: one before the ‘change’ and one after.  The benefit of using DID is that 
even if there are unobservable factors that influenced a GP’s reservation status and could affect 
public goods provision, our estimate of the effect of reservation on public goods provision will 
be unbiased if those factors do not change differently over time in reserved and unreserved GPs.  
In its most general form, the DID estimator compares the change over time between the 
two groups.  Consider unreserved (U) and reserved (R) GPs and the time periods 1991 (before 
the 73rd Amendment policies were instituted in Tamil Nadu) and 2005 (the fourth year of a Tamil 
11 
 
Nadu GP president’s term in office, which is the ninth year of a 10-year reservation cycle).18 In 
this case, the DID estimator is given by 
𝐷𝐼𝐷� = �𝑌R,2005 − 𝑌R,1991� − �𝑌U,2005 − 𝑌U,1991�, (1) 
where Y is the dependent variable of interest (public goods), group R consists of reserved GPs, 
group U consists of unreserved GPs, and Y̅g,t is the mean value of Y for group g and time t.  The 
DID estimator can also be obtained from a regression of the form 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
for GP i in time period t, where RESERVED is a dummy variable equaling 1 for reserved GPs 
and AFTER is a dummy variable equaling 1 for observations occurring in 2005, after Tamil 
Nadu’s reservation policy was implemented.  ?̂?3 is the DID estimate.  In a fixed effects 
estimation—as we perform in Section IV—RESERVED is dropped.   
An unbiased estimate of β3 from Equation (2) requires that any unobservable factors that 
influence whether a GP received treatment and affect the GP’s public goods outcomes have a 
similar trend over time in reserved and unreserved GPs.  For example, if, over time, GPs with 
higher female population ratios have a different rate of change in political party affiliations and if 
political party affiliations impact public goods provision, then our estimates could be biased.  We 
provide some evidence of similar trends in reserved and unreserved GPs by comparing the 
change in village characteristics over 1991–2005 (Table 2, rightmost column).  We see no 
statistically significant difference in the change in village characteristics over the 1991–2005 
period for any variables except for the SC population.  Although the rate of growth in the SC 
population was greater in GPs that were unreserved in 2005, we do not think this is a major 
18 Data on public toilets, household toilets, and buses and minibuses are from 1995 and 2004.  Because 1996 was the 
first year of reservation, these years are suitable for the analysis, as they provide data from before reservation and 
from the eighth year of the reservation. 
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cause for concern for two reasons.  First, the SC population in two unreserved GPs increased by 
more than 600 percent from 1991–2005, growing from 23 to 192 and 64 to 465.  There are also 
four other unreserved GPs whose SC populations grew by more than 150 percent.  Excluding 
these huge growers causes the statistical significance to disappear.  Second, there is anecdotal 
evidence that with the advent of SC reservations and other SC affirmative action-type programs, 
more people are claiming SC status or are no longer denying their SC status (Anand and Sharma 
2011).  This phenomenon might explain the observed difference in the SC population.  
We further refine our DID estimation to include covariates, so our estimates will still be 
accurate even if there are different trends in the SC population or other variables.  The DID 
estimate in this case is given by 𝛾�3 of the following regression: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛾1𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝛾3(𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡) +𝝋𝑿+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where 𝑿 contains covariates such as the GP’s female and SC population ratios in 1991 (i.e., the 
values on which the reservations are based).19  
IV. The Analysis 
Of the 144 villages in our survey, 47 have GPs with presidential seats reserved for 
women,20 which perfectly represents India’s requirement that one-third of GP president seats be 
reserved for women.  Only one GP failed to comply with the reservation policy by seating a male 
president, leaving 46 women-led GPs in our analysis.  The women presidents are 42 years of age 
on average (ranging from 27 to 65), and 61 percent cite farming as their primary occupation.  
19 Because we perform a fixed-effects regression, time-invariant covariates (such as 1991 population ratios) are 
interacted with a time dummy (i.e., AFTER).  A more intuitive way to think about this is as a cross-sectional 
regression of the form yDIFFi = α + δ1RESERVEDi + ηX + εi, where yDIFF is the change in the amount of public 
good y from 1991 to 2005 and 𝛿1�  is the DID estimate. 
20 In a previous version of this paper, we cited different reservation statistics.  This was the result of a data entry 
error, which has been checked and rectified in this paper. 
13 
 
                                                 
Thirty-nine percent of the women cite the reservation of the presidential seat as their primary 
motivation for running for office, 33 percent cite past work with the community as their 
motivation, and 28 percent cite ‘other’ reasons.  There are no women presidents in unreserved 
GPs. 
Tamil Nadu is a leader in women’s empowerment in India, and this is reflected by the 
high literacy rate for women: 64 percent, compared to the all-India female literacy rate of 54 
percent.21 The education level of female presidents in our sample is also very comparable to that 
of male presidents: 47 and 41 percent of male and female GP presidents, respectively, have at 
least a high school education, and 82 and 74 percent have at least a middle-school education.  
However, on a knowledge test22 of the GP president’s duties and the panchayat system in general 
that was given to presidents during the individual interviews, female presidents scored much 
lower than their male counterparts (Figure 1).  For example, only 28 percent of female presidents 
in women-reserved GPs answered at least 11 of the 19 questions correctly, compared to 90 
percent of male presidents.  Gender strongly predicts presidents’ test scores even after 
controlling for presidents’ age, whether this is their second term, education, income, caste, 
religion, political party affiliation, and motivation for running for office (Table 5).  The 
correlation between gender and test scores is not only strongly significant but of large magnitude 
as well.  Given such poor knowledge of the GP, we might expect the performance of female 
presidents in women-reserved GPs to suffer.  In particular, we might expect to see fewer public 
goods provided by female presidents in women-reserved GPs because the GP president plays a 
key role in procuring public goods for the GP.  This knowledge disparity is much more 
21 These statistics come from the 2001 Census. 
22 The 19 questions on the knowledge test are given in Appendix A1.  
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pronounced than Beaman et al. (2010) find in West Bengal.  Additionally, this GP knowledge 
gap among women GP presidents in Tamil Nadu exists the fourth year into their term in office.   
Reserved-female presidents also have much less contact with higher-level officials (Table 
6).  These findings are significant at the one percent level and represent substantial differences in 
contact for all three higher-level officials.  To fund projects within a GP, the GP president must 
be in contact with higher-level officials to apply for funds through government schemes 
administered at higher levels.  According to our survey team’s observations, the main function of 
the GP president is to identify needs and take the necessary steps to mobilize funds.  Only very 
low-cost village projects can be undertaken by the GP president without consultation with 
higher-level officials.  The most important person with whom Tamil Nadu’s GP presidents must 
be in contact is the Block Development Officer (BDO), followed by the Panchayat Union 
Chairman (PUC), both of whom are officials at the intermediate level (Union) of the three-tier 
panchayat system.  Contact with the District level is largely left to the Union.  This is supported 
by our data: most contact is with the BDO, followed by the PUC.  Both men and women GP 
presidents have much less contact with the District Panchayat Chairman (DPC), though the 
difference between men and women is still statistically significant.  Thus, women GP presidents’ 
significantly lower contact with higher-level officials—particularly at the Union level—provides 
another reason to suspect that they may have difficulty providing public goods for their 
constituency.  
A natural question is whether these differences between men and women result from 
more experience by male presidents vis-à-vis female presidents.  However, there are very few 
incumbents on both sides: only nine percent for women (four of 46 seats) and 12 percent for men 
(12 of 98 seats).  Given only 16 experienced presidents in the dataset, the prospects for analysis 
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are limited.  However, we can confidently say that differences in experience are not driving the 
knowledge and contact differences between men and women presidents.  Eliminating the 16 
experienced presidents does not change the findings or the significance of the difference between 
men and women in terms of their contact with the higher-level officials, and it does not impact 
the strong correlation between gender and test scores.  Interestingly, the 16 experienced 
presidents have statistically significantly (1) higher knowledge test scores (on average, they 
answer almost two more questions correctly) and (2) more contact with the PUC compared to 
non-experienced presidents, providing some evidence that experience as a GP president does 
matter.  However, differences in experience alone do not drive the differences between men and 
women.       
Preferences 
We examine male and female preferences for public goods to determine whether 
presidents provide public goods according to their preferences.  We estimate preferences using 
survey questions posed to 270 citizens (139 men and 131 women) randomly sampled in 27 
villages over the three districts surveyed in Tamil Nadu.  One question asks citizens to list up to 
five infrastructure items needed in their village.  All persons of a given GP were surveyed from 
the same village, so no bias resulted from different provision in different villages of the GP.  
More than 30 different responses were given by the 270 citizens.23 
The results of chi-square tests of whether men’s and women’s preferences are drawn 
from different distributions are presented in the supplemental appendix (Table S1.3).  Regardless 
of whether we conduct the test on all responses given by the group or the top five or 10 
responses within the group, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that men’s and women’s 
23 A list of all responses is given in the supplemental appendix (Table S1.2). 
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preferences are drawn from the same distribution.24  This finding is in contrast to Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo (2004), who find differences in preferences for public goods in Rajasthan and West 
Bengal using a chi-square test, illustrating the importance of context-specific analyses.  We also 
provide individual t-tests of the percentage of men and women that listed each infrastructure item 
(Table S1.4).  There are no statistically significant differences, with the exception of veterinary 
services (mentioned by only 14 citizens).  Of the top 11 areas mentioned, we investigate eight in 
our public goods analysis.  We do not have good data on ‘drainage’ or ‘group houses,’ and the 
GP president does not have much control over ‘companies and industries.’25 
Results 
We next compare changes in public goods from 1991 to 2005 across unreserved and 
reserved GPs.  Regardless of whether there is a gender difference in preferences, we are still 
interested in examining whether men and women provide different amounts of public goods 
because there are strong reasons to suspect there may be a difference: 
1) Women’s low scores on the knowledge test suggest that women might not be able to 
function well as GP presidents and thus might have lower public goods provision. 
2) Women’s minimal interaction with higher-level officials suggests that women might 
have lower public goods provision, at least for those goods that require coordination 
and/or support from higher levels of the panchayat system. 
We have data on many measures of public goods provision in the GPs, but we restrict this 
analysis to public goods that coincide with citizens’ most preferred items of infrastructure, as 
24 In a previous version of this paper, we counted only the first three—instead of all five—responses given by 
individuals, thinking that this indicated individuals’ strongest opinions.  However, after discussions with the 
research team, we determined that it was erroneous to omit any responses. All responses are thus counted in this 
analysis. 
25 We use the top 11 responses instead of 10 because “Streetlights” and “Independent pipeline/toilet connections” 
are tied as the tenth most mentioned items of infrastructure. 
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discussed in Section IV.  We use 10 public goods measures (covering eight areas of public 
goods), which are described in Appendix A2.  These variables reflect changes in physical 
infrastructure during a president’s time in office as well as changes in outcomes.  For example, 
we use data on the number of schools to measure investment in schools and education, whereas 
we use data on the percentage of children given various immunizations as an outcome measure 
of investments in health.  These measures are used in a basic DID estimation strategy (Equation 
2), with results given in Table 7. 
Of our 10 measures of public goods, five measures exhibit no statistically significant 
difference in provision between male and female presidents: children’s health, bus trips, public 
toilets, borewells, and common taps.  Of these five, the point estimates are quite small in all 
cases with the exception of common taps.  For the other five measures, we find that GPs with 
and without a woman in a reserved president seat had statistically significantly different changes 
in provision from 1991 to 2005: women-reserved GPs added fewer schools, fewer household 
drinking water connections, fewer household toilet connections, and fewer operational 
streetlights, and the distance to the nearest concrete road was farther away.  In all cases, the 
change in the level of public goods indicates lower provision in women-reserved GPs versus 
unreserved GPs.  Although we will not place too much emphasis on precise numbers, these 
differences are of non-trivial magnitude.  The results suggest that women-reserved GPs had close 
to one fewer school, 13 fewer operational streetlights, 49 fewer household toilets, and 50 fewer 
household drinking water connections, and the nearest concrete road was 0.08 kilometers farther 
away compared with unreserved GPs.         
Table 8 shows the results of a DID estimation with the following covariates added 
(Equation 3): the number of villages that compose the GP, GP female and SC population ratios 
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in 1991, log of GP total population in 1991, a dummy variable indicating a president’s 
membership in the AIADMK political party,26 log of total land area of the GP in 1991, the 
knowledge test score, and a dummy variable indicating low (=0) or high (=1) frequency of 
contact with the Block Development Officer, an important official situated one level above the 
GP.27  These covariates control for relevant characteristics that could influence public goods 
provision if they are trending differently over time. 
The results suggest that fewer schools and roads were created in female-reserved GPs, 
and these differences are non-trivial.  For the remaining measures of public goods, we find no 
statistically significant difference in provision between reserved and unreserved GPs.  However, 
the point estimates on the effect of having a woman in a reserved seat remain large, of the same 
sign, and have comparable coefficients vis-à-vis the basic DID findings in the cases of 
streetlights, household toilet connections, and household drinking water connections, all 
indicating lower levels of provision in women-reserved GPs.  Only in the case of common taps is 
the point estimate suggestive that women presidents in reserved GPs are providing more of this 
public good, although this is statistically insignificant in all specifications.  Thus, overall, we find 
strong evidence that female presidents in Tamil Nadu’s reserved GPs provide fewer schools and 
roads and weak evidence that they provide less of some other goods as well.  We find almost no 
evidence of women in reserved seats doing better in any aspect of GP public goods provision.     
Including presidents’ test scores and frequency of contact with the BDO reveals that 
higher test scores and more frequent contact are positively correlated with public goods 
26 The party in power in Tamil Nadu generally alternates between the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) and 
AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) parties. In 2005, the AIADMK was in power from the 
2001 elections. For GP-level elections, the de jure rules state that candidates cannot run on a political party. 
However, de facto, their party affiliation does play a role. 
27 We also did this for contact with the Panchayat Union Chairman (PUC) and District Panchayat Chairman (DPC); 
the results are similar.  We report only the results using BDO to save space.  Additionally, the BDO is arguably the 
most important higher-level official with whom to be in touch. 
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provision.  Although these variables are significant in only a few cases, this is likely due to 
inflated standard errors from the relatively high correlation between test scores, frequency of 
contact, and a GP’s reservation status.  Indeed, the correlation between reservation status and test 
scores is 61 percent, and it is 50 percent between reservation status and frequency of contact with 
the BDO.   
As expected, a larger population is positively correlated with the provision of some 
public goods: household toilet and water connections, schools, borewells, and roads.  We also 
find that having more villages that compose a GP is associated with greater provision of schools, 
which coincides with our intuition.  Additionally, affiliation with the AIADMK party is 
associated with more common taps and more schools. 
Further Checks 
As discussed in Section I, a regression discontinuity design is ideal in many ways.  
However, given data restrictions, we do not pursue RD as the main analysis.  We instead present 
a simple RD analysis in the supplemental Appendix S3.  The results show a clear gap in the case 
of schools and smaller gaps for roads and household drinking water connections, although none 
of the results is statistically significant.  This is likely due to too few observations when we 
consider data only within a bandwidth around the discontinuity. 
Given concerns that experienced presidents might be driving the results, we also 
duplicate the DID with covariates analysis excluding the 16 presidents in their second term in 
office.  Our findings hold and, in fact, are stronger: in addition to schools and roads, there is 
some evidence that women presidents provide fewer household toilet and drinking water 
connections, which are also higher-cost public goods that require coordination with higher-level 
officials such as the BDO and PUC (Table S1.5).   
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V. Discussion 
Our findings suggest that for at least some public goods, presidents in women-reserved 
GPs are providing fewer public goods relative to unreserved GPs.  There is evidence that these 
women are performing similarly to men in some aspects, but there is almost no evidence that 
they are providing more of any public good.     
Given women’s apparent lack of knowledge regarding the GP coupled with their limited 
contact with block- and district-level officials, it is not surprising that we find women presidents 
in reserved GPs providing fewer public goods compared to male presidents.  We can identify two 
pathways through which the knowledge test helps to explain women’s poorer performance.  If 
the knowledge test is an accurate measure of a president’s ability, then the test results indicate 
that women are of lower ability.  We would thus expect to see lower public goods provision in 
female-reserved GPs.  If the knowledge test is not a good measure of ability and one could be a 
successful president despite being unable to correctly answer most questions on our knowledge 
test, the lower test scores are still indicative of something.  Presidents took this knowledge test, 
consisting of basic questions about the panchayat, in the fourth year of their presidencies.  If a 
sitting president is active in their position, he or she should be able to answer most questions 
correctly, having encountered those issues during their four years in office.  The poor test results 
of female presidents at least indicate a lack of engagement with their political office.  Therefore, 
if a low test score indicates a lack of participation in GP activities by the president, we would 
again expect to see lower public goods provision by presidents with lower test scores.      
Next, we consider schools and roads, two public goods for which there exists a robust 
difference in provision between reserved and unreserved GPs.  Our data suggest that over the 
course of the first reservation cycle in Tamil Nadu GPs, there were significantly more schools 
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created in unreserved versus women-reserved GPs.  The creation of a new school requires 
substantial coordination with higher-level officials.  Thus, this finding is consistent with reserved 
women presidents’ clear lack of engagement with higher-level officials.  A similar story holds 
for roads, where our results show that the distance to the nearest concrete road is farther in 
women-reserved GPs.  Additionally, there are fewer household drinking water and toilet 
connections and fewer operational streetlights.  These are only significant in the basic DID, 
although the sign and size of the point estimates are consistent in the DID with covariates.  
Household connections are another GP public good that require coordination with higher-level 
officials because part of their funding is provided by the panchayat (hence their inclusion in our 
analysis of public goods).  As a comparison, vaccinations are completely out of the control of the 
GP president, and we see no difference in vaccinations to children measured by the HEALTH 
variable.  To the best of our knowledge, these findings are new in the literature.   
Our research underscores the importance of context in empirical studies.  The findings in 
some previous research are compelling and provide evidence of women’s reservations doing 
good for women in parts of West Bengal (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Beaman et al. 2009; 
Beaman et al. 2012).  However, these results do not represent the status of women’s reservations 
throughout India’s GPs.  Mathew (2000a) reviews the history of local governance throughout 
India, showing the differences in Indian states’ experiences with decentralized governance.  West 
Bengal, for example, is often cited as India’s panchayat success story and has had regular 
elections to the panchayats since 1978 (Ghosh 2000).  Additionally, West Bengal amended its 
state panchayat act in 1992—before India’s 73rd Amendment was passed—to provide for one-
third reservation of all seats in all three levels of panchayats for women (although there was no 
explicit reservation for the position of president) (Ghosh 2000).  In accordance with the 73rd 
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Amendment, West Bengal amended its state panchayat act to reserve one-third of GP 
presidential seats for women.  Of its own accord, West Bengal further amended its panchayat 
system to reserve one-third of vice-president positions for women as well.  Thus, by the late 
1990s, women in West Bengal’s panchayats had significant experience in panchayats in addition 
to participating in panchayats that had been successful since the late 1970s.   
We contrast West Bengal’s experience with that of Tamil Nadu.  Tamil Nadu had 
reasonably successful local governance under British rule (Aram and Palanithurai 2000).  After 
India’s independence in 1947, Tamil Nadu’s 1958 panchayat act led to what was considered a 
rather successful panchayat system until about 1970 (Aram and Palanithurai 2000).  However, 
after the 1970 panchayat elections, Tamil Nadu’s elections were postponed until 1986.  From 
then until Tamil Nadu’s Panchayat Act of 1994, local governance was very different than it is 
now and was very different from the experience of West Bengal.  For example, prior to the 1994 
Act, Tamil Nadu had a district-level panchayat with minimal power, whereas most power was at 
the block level. 
Thus, the performance of panchayats and women in panchayats certainly varies by state 
given their diverse histories and experiences with panchayat institutions.  Although the 73rd 
Amendment set forth a constitutionally mandated structure of panchayats for all states, the rich 
history of local governance preceding the 73rd Amendment has surely influenced the functioning 
of panchayats following the 73rd Amendment.  It is this important notion that we wish to 
emphasize in our findings of public goods provision by women presidents in women-reserved 
GPs in Tamil Nadu. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
Given the rising prevalence of gender reservations and quotas in developing country 
governments, our study seeks to better understand the role of gender in public goods provision in 
a specific setting.  Using data from 144 village-level governments in Tamil Nadu, we investigate 
women’s reservations at the GP level and evaluate the role of presidents’ gender on local public 
goods provision.  For some public goods, provision is similar among female and male presidents.  
However, we find very suggestive evidence that public goods provision by women presidents in 
women-reserved GPs is lower than that of their male counterparts.  In particular, we find strong 
evidence that GPs with women-reserved president seats created fewer schools and roads than 
unreserved GPs during the period under study.  We find weak evidence that women are 
providing fewer streetlights and household drinking water and toilet connections.  These findings 
are correlated with strong evidence of women’s lack of interaction with higher-level government 
officials and women’s low knowledge of the GP.    
 These findings contribute to the literature on women’s reservations in India by 
highlighting that the GP reservation system may be falling short in providing knowledge of the 
GP to women who are new to political office and in providing a pathway for connections 
between women GP presidents and higher-level officials.  To our knowledge, this is the first 
study to document a clear lack of communication between women GP presidents and higher-
level officials at the block and district levels and to link this lack of communication to 
demonstrably worse outcomes for the GP, particularly in terms of the provision of schools and 
roads. 
This study highlights the need—in at least some parts of India—to improve women’s 
preparedness for the office of GP president and their connections while in office.  Increased or 
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more targeted training for female presidents may help to improve their knowledge of the 
panchayat system and their understanding of their role as GP president and in panchayati raj in 
general, thus improving their performance of official duties and the procurement of funds and 
public goods for their GP.  Indeed, many of the female presidents interviewed for this study 
complained that training was given either too late or not at all and that they were given an 
overwhelmingly large amount of paperwork to read and understand without accompanying 
support.  This suggests that more timely and adequate training for female presidents may further 
support their role in Indian governance and help them to better achieve one of the main goals of 
women’s reservation policies: having pro-women, pro-family, pro-children advocates in 
government.   
Our findings also highlight the importance of context in empirical analyses.  Previous 
findings in West Bengal show that women’s reservations have the potential to address the needs 
of women.  Our findings in Tamil Nadu show that this does not happen automatically.  We need 
not wait 30 years for women in Tamil Nadu to learn to make the most out of their positions in 
office.  Our study shows that there is a lack of knowledge among women GP presidents and a 
weak relationship between women GP presidents and higher-level officials.  We do not take our 
findings to represent the state of women’s reservations across India.  We do, however, interpret 
our findings as representative of women’s reservations in at least some parts of Tamil Nadu and 
as evidence that the implementation of women’s reservations in India needs further improvement 
to realize the potential of women’s representation in government.  
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Figure 1: Results of a 19-Question Knowledge Test Given to GP Presidents 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
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Table 1: Female and SC Population Ratios by Block (Year=1991) 
District Block 
GPs per 
block (in 
sample) 
Mean, 
female/total 
population 
ratio 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean,  
SC/total 
population  
ratio 
Standard 
deviation 
Coimbatore 
Avinashi 12 0.480 0.016 0.257 0.063 
Gudimangalam 12 0.497 0.011 0.266 0.065 
Palladam 12 0.491 0.013 0.209 0.056 
Pollachi (North) 12 0.489 0.014 0.218 0.092 
Pudukottai 
Aranthangi 12 0.506 0.012 0.104 0.076 
Karambakudi 12 0.498 0.012 0.271 0.168 
Kunnandar Koil 12 0.495 0.010 0.179 0.133 
Ponnamaravathi 12 0.522 0.016 0.198 0.115 
Vellore 
K.V. Kuppam 12 0.494 0.015 0.287 0.177 
Kanniyambadi 12 0.505 0.011 0.242 0.111 
Natrampalli 12 0.491 0.009 0.223 0.176 
Nemeli 12 0.496 0.012 0.290 0.174 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
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Table 2: Comparing Village Characteristics in GPs Unreserved and Reserved for Female 
Presidents 
Variable 1991 Mean, Unreserved GPs 
1991 Mean, 
Reserved GPs 
Difference in 
1991 Means 
Difference in 
Percent Change 
1991 to 2005 
Village population - total 2648.622 2289.717 358.905 0.145     251.410 0.112 
Female population 1299.816 1153.130 146.686 0.152     121.847 0.108 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 
population 
551.959 552.935 -0.976 0.327* 
    70.585 0.167 
Households total 607.592 533.544 74.048 0.165     61.262 0.112 
Hindu households 575.929 512.674 63.255 0.174     60.499 0.144 
Muslim households 19.959 14.870 5.090 0.060     4.300 0.160 
Christian households 11.704 6.000 5.704** 0.052     2.607 0.174 
Farm households 329.845 303.130 26.715 0.163     38.818 0.125 
Village citizens working 
in village 
594.490 481.804 112.685 -2.317 
    74.921 1.770 
Female village citizens 
working in village 
271.857 220.696 51.161 -3.878 
    35.393 2.566 
Total Land (acres) 2227.691 2077.151 150.540 0.141     242.569 0.103 
Literates 1221.255 1084.391 136.864 0.218     132.655 0.170 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
Notes: Standard errors from a t-test of a difference in means are shown in italics.  
    
Indicates significance at *10%, **5%. 
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Table 3: Comparing Initial Public Goods Levels in GPs Unreserved and Reserved for Female 
Presidents (Year=1991) 
  Unreserved GPs 
GPs Reserved  
for Women Difference 
  Mean 1991 Mean 1991 
Number of 
borewells 
3.330 3.780 -0.451 
    0.545 
Distance to nearest 
borewell 
0.232 0.230 0.002 
    0.040 
HEALTH - 
Composite measure 
-0.017 0.037 -0.054 
    0.179 
Distance to nearest 
concrete road 
0.447 0.364 0.082 
    0.093 
Number of schools 2.582 2.261 0.321     0.265 
Number of public 
toilets 
0.459 0.304 0.155* 
    0.088 
Number of bus and 
minibus trips 
8.643 7.674 0.969 
    1.702 
Common taps 44.133 48.178 -4.045     9.929 
HH toilets 10.980 7.652 3.327     2.844 
HH drinking water 
connection 
19.061 16.891 2.170 
    8.285 
Streetlights 
60.551 52.870 7.681 
    8.266 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
Notes: Standard errors from a t-test of a difference in means are shown in 
italics. 
* p<.10. 
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Tables 4a-4b: Summary Statistics  
Table 4a: Summary Statistics (Year=1991) 
Variable  Obs Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Village population - total 144 2533.97 1411.77 364 7355 
Female population 144 1252.96 682.82 185 3519 
Scheduled Caste (SC) population 144 552.27 393.55 0 1891 
Ratio of SC to total population 144 0.23 0.13 0 0.67 
Ratio of females to total population 144 0.50 0.02 0.43 0.55 
Households - total 144 583.94 343.32 75 1892 
Hindu households 144 555.72 338.61 53 1863 
Muslim households 144 18.33 24.09 0 113 
Christian households 144 9.88 14.78 0 100 
Farm households 143 321.25 216.43 31 1260 
Total land (acres) 144 2179.60 1354.29 281.70 5719 
Village citizens working in village 144 558.49 421.04 5 1757 
Female village citizens working in village 144 255.51 198.78 0 985 
Literates 144 1177.54 742.39 160 3436 
Number of schools 144 2.48 1.49 1 10 
Distance to nearest concrete road 144 0.42 0.52 0 5 
Number of bus and minibus trips 144 8.33 9.50 0 60 
Streetlights 144 58.10 46.23 0 270 
Number of public toilets 144 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Common taps 143 45.41 54.98 0 425 
Number of borewells 139 3.46 2.93 0 14 
HH toilets 144 9.92 15.93 0 82 
HH drinking water connections 144 18.37 46.20 0 325 
Percentage of children under 6 with DPT vaccine  144 0.21 0.21 0.04 1.36 
Percentage of children under 6 with BCG vaccine  144 0.21 0.21 0.03 1.36 
Percentage of children under 6 with OPV vaccine  144 0.22 0.23 0 1.43 
Percentage of children under 6 with measles vaccine  144 0.20 0.22 0.04 1.56 
Percentage of children under 6 with TT vaccine 144 0.30 0.30 0.05 2.11 
GP reserved for woman 144 -- -- -- -- 
GP president's age 144 -- -- -- -- 
GP president member of AIADMK 143 -- -- -- -- 
GP president test score (out of 19) 144 -- -- -- -- 
Frequency of contact with Block Development Officer 144 -- -- -- -- 
Frequency of contact with Panchayat Union Chairman 144 -- -- -- -- 
Frequency of contact with District Panchayat Chairman 144 -- -- -- -- 
Number of villages in GP 144 -- -- -- -- 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
Notes: Since the first GP elections in accordance with the 73rd Amendment took place in 1996, GP president-
specific information is for 2005 only. 
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Table 4b: Summary Statistics (Year=2005) 
Variable  Obs Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Village population – total 144 3120.21 2135.04 344 15420 
Female population 144 1558.88 1043.27 170 7353 
Scheduled Caste (SC) population 144 655.89 471.32 0 2296 
Ratio of SC to total population 144 0.23 0.13 0 0.70 
Ratio of females to total population 144 0.50 0.02 0.43 0.57 
Households - total 144 735.88 515.74 68 4287 
Hindu households 144 693.61 504.60 45 4187 
Muslim households 144 26.58 37.71 0 261 
Christian households 144 15.69 22.73 0 150 
Farm households 144 365.44 262.04 35 1725 
Total land (acres) 142 2086.79 1318.02 223.50 5729.40 
Village citizens working in village 144 861.88 681.83 2 3780 
Female village citizens working in village 144 399.58 339.60 2 2220 
Literates 144 1853.95 1359.26 184 10188 
Number of schools 144 3.30 2.14 1 13 
Distance to nearest concrete road 144 0.25 0.38 0 3.00 
Number of bus and minibus trips 144 13.22 14.38 0 80 
Streetlights 144 100.66 70.41 0 451 
Number of public toilets 144 1.75 1.62 0 10 
Common taps 144 84.48 74.65 0 430 
Number of borewells 139 6.74 5.08 0 31 
HH toilets 144 129.70 203.83 0 1750 
HH drinking water connections 144 125.96 150.95 0 900 
Percentage of children under 6 with DPT vaccine  144 0.31 0.29 0.03 1.90 
Percentage of children under 6 with BCG vaccine  144 0.30 0.30 0.02 1.84 
Percentage of children under 6 with OPV vaccine  144 0.32 0.31 0.03 1.90 
Percentage of children under 6 with Measles vaccine  144 0.30 0.30 0.03 1.88 
Percentage of children under 6 with TT vaccine 144 0.44 0.40 0.04 2.33 
GP reserved for woman 144 0.32 0.47 0 1 
GP president's age 144 47.00 8.86 27 68 
GP president member of AIADMK 143 0.60 0.49 0 1 
GP president test score (out of 19) 144 11.76 3.00 5 18 
Frequency of contact with Block Development Officer* 144 2.75 0.47 1 3 
Frequency of contact with Panchayat Union Chairman* 144 1.74 1.00 0 3 
Frequency of contact with District Panchayat Chairman* 144 1.01 0.76 0 3 
Number of villages in GP 144 6.26 4.68 1 39 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
Notes: * “Frequency of Contact with…” was a question posed to GP presidents. 0=“never,” 1=“rarely,” 
2=“sometimes,” and 3=“frequently.”  
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Table 5: Predicting Test Scores 
Dependent variable for all regressions: President’s score on the knowledge test 
President (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Characteristics       
Gender -3.457*** -3.480*** -3.472*** -3.310*** -3.380*** -3.199*** 
 (0.483) (0.470) (0.473) (0.477) (0.481) (0.474) 
Primary school -0.470 -0.428 -0.419 -1.044 -1.064 -0.814 
 (1.247) (1.202) (1.206) (1.215) (1.207) (1.121) 
Middle school 0.725 0.857 0.864 0.140 0.159 0.463 
 (1.169) (1.128) (1.131) (1.183) (1.163) (1.069) 
High school 1.044 1.159 1.143 0.465 0.447 0.923 
 (1.165) (1.117) (1.121) (1.163) (1.137) (1.056) 
Higher secondary 0.945 1.276 1.284 0.569 0.734 1.455 
 (1.451) (1.428) (1.433) (1.566) (1.545) (1.500) 
College 2.269* 2.511** 2.519** 1.700 1.507 1.951 
 (1.302) (1.259) (1.263) (1.308) (1.307) (1.213) 
Age 0.041* 0.043* 0.042* 0.028 0.031 0.029 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Second term 1.275 1.324* 1.333* 1.292* 1.393* 1.663** 
 (0.838) (0.798) (0.801) (0.732) (0.732) (0.774) 
SC  0.782 0.790 1.447*** 1.343** 1.380** 
  (0.546) (0.549) (0.549) (0.559) (0.571) 
MBC  0.989 1.003 1.146* 1.357* 1.315* 
  (0.643) (0.646) (0.617) (0.690) (0.666) 
Muslim   1.007** 1.508*** 1.282*** 0.662 
   (0.415) (0.424) (0.464) (0.594) 
Log total income    0.434** 0.400** 0.331* 
    (0.191) (0.198) (0.199) 
AIADMK Party     0.462 0.745* 
     (0.422) (0.447) 
Motive: polit      2.126** 
      (0.910) 
Motive: reserved      -0.937* 
      (0.477) 
Motive: other      0.393 
      (0.466) 
Constant 10.029*** 9.649*** 9.654*** 5.865** 5.850** 6.188** 
 (1.615) (1.623) (1.628) (2.467) (2.442) (2.415) 
Observations 144 144 144 142 141 141 
R-squared 0.458 0.471 0.472 0.479 0.487 0.511 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text.Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Schooling 
level indicates highest level completed, MBC=most backward caste, AIADMK indicates affiliation with the 
AIADMK party, and ‘Motive’ indicates presidents’ motives for running for office (polit=nominated by political 
party, reserved=seat was reserved).  Two observations are lost when the income variable is added due to two 
presidents with zero income. 
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.1. 
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Table 6: GP Presidents’ Contact with Higher-Level Panchayat Officials 
 
 
Unreserved 
GPs 
GPs Reserved  
for Women Difference 
Contact with Block 
Development Officer (BDO) 
2.908 2.413 0.495*** 
  0.072 
Contact with Panchayat 
Union Chairman (PUC) 
2.214 0.717 1.497*** 
  0.129 
Contact with District 
Panchayat Chairman (DPC) 
1.306 0.391 0.915*** 
  0.112 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
Notes: Standard errors from a t-test of a difference in means are shown in italics. 
‘Contact with…’ refers to the frequency of contact between the GP president and the listed 
official, as answered by the GP president in an interview.  0=‘Never,’ 1=‘Rarely,’ 
2=‘Sometimes,’ 3=‘Frequently.’ 
*** p<.01. 
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Table 7: Basic DID Estimation  
  Reserved GPs Unreserved GPs Time Period Difference 
DID 
Estimator Variable  Mean 1991 
Mean 
2005 
Mean 
1991 
Mean 
2005 
Diff 
Reserved 
Diff 
Unreserved 
Health  
(Composite Measure) 
0.037 0.047 -0.017 -0.022 0.010 -0.005 0.014 
(1.029) (0.841) (0.986) (1.065) [0.075] [0.082] [0.110] 
Schools 
2.261 2.609 2.582 3.622 0.348*** 1.041*** -0.693*** 
(1.219) (1.291) (1.592) (2.375) [0.095] [0.162] [0.187] 
Distance (km) to nearest 
concrete road 
0.364 0.249 0.447 0.253 -0.115*** -0.193*** 0.078* 
(0.297) (0.326) (0.593) (0.401) [0.026] [0.035] [0.044] 
Bus and minibus trips 
7.674 12.761 8.643 13.439 5.087*** 4.796*** 0.291 
(7.457) (13.820) (10.346) (14.693) [1.330] [0.611] [1.452] 
Streetlights 
52.870 86.370 60.551 107.367 33.500*** 46.816*** -13.316** 
(47.842) (54.832) (45.493) (75.970) [3.931] [4.308] [5.804] 
Public toilets 
0.304 1.478 0.459 1.878 1.174*** 1.418*** -0.244 
(0.465) (1.472) (0.501) (1.676) [0.224] [0.172] [0.281] 
Common taps 
48.178 96.587 44.133 78.796 50.111*** 34.663*** 15.448 
(54.542) (84.957) (55.410) (69.024) [8.914] [4.646] [9.975] 
Number of borewells 
3.780 7.154 3.330 6.565 3.374*** 3.235*** 0.139 
(3.513) (6.078) (2.655) (4.629) [0.523] [0.303] [0.599] 
HH toilet connection 
7.652 94.348 10.980 146.296 86.696*** 135.316*** -48.621* 
(10.861) (101.868) (17.776) (235.716) [15.244] [23.920] [28.273] 
HH drinking water 
connection 
16.891 90.196 19.061 142.745 73.304*** 123.684*** -50.379** 
(47.532) (100.499) (45.800) (167.372) [12.427] [16.613] [20.667] 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
Notes: Standard deviations are given in (parentheses). 
Robust Standard errors are given in [brackets]. 
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10. 
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Table 8: DID Estimation with Covariates  
  
Health 
(Composite 
Measure) 
Schools 
Distance 
(km) to 
nearest 
concrete 
road 
Bus and 
minibus 
trips 
Streetlights Public toilets 
Common 
taps 
Number of 
borewells 
HH toilet 
connection 
HH 
drinking 
water 
connection 
Woman 
Res*2005 
-0.104 -0.840*** 0.106* 0.357 -4.291 0.121 17.938 0.423 -20.315 -45.331 
(0.164) (0.252) (0.062) (1.677) (7.982) (0.371) (13.279) (0.733) (32.610) (29.094) 
2005 -3.415 -7.421** 0.350 -10.881 11.068 -5.383 72.311 -14.983* -270.358 -248.201 (2.440) (3.678) (0.798) (18.586) (160.442) (6.728) (191.438) (7.950) (480.199) (553.813) 
# Vills in GP -0.016 0.050** 0.008 0.144 2.191 0.014 -1.335 0.007 10.228 1.978 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.006) (0.152) (1.831) (0.035) (1.111) (0.087) (12.132) (4.877) 
SC Pop Ratio 
(1991) 
0.917** 0.703 0.081 -1.620 -5.539 -0.903 -17.820 1.968 210.418** 150.727 
(0.407) (1.179) (0.173) (3.551) (19.341) (0.888) (24.746) (1.671) (82.553) (93.549) 
Female Pop 
Ratio (1991) 
7.719 9.296 1.014 11.613 -90.043 9.404 -283.453 7.100 -1,481.365* -379.429 
(5.579) (5.842) (1.261) (31.666) (270.071) (9.512) (313.125) (12.954) (887.773) (879.073) 
AIADMK 
Party 
0.160 0.387* 0.015 1.004 7.576 0.007 15.674* -0.050 13.432 19.973 
(0.117) (0.211) (0.052) (1.199) (5.611) (0.331) (8.220) (0.505) (29.490) (20.940) 
Log Total Pop 
(1991) 
-0.138 0.764*** -0.109** 0.555 4.192 -0.182 1.781 0.971** 90.779*** 73.802*** 
(0.175) (0.219) (0.044) (0.997) (5.432) (0.299) (9.917) (0.441) (25.816) (20.769) 
Log Total Land 
(1991) 
0.088 -0.412** -0.058* 1.277 2.551 0.356 16.086* 0.740* 38.009* 6.526 
(0.101) (0.164) (0.034) (1.131) (8.158) (0.329) (8.598) (0.412) (22.416) (20.229) 
Test Score 0.019 -0.043 0.011 -0.042 1.358 0.107* 0.740 0.064 -0.253 -0.280 
(0.018) (0.039) (0.008) (0.272) (1.382) (0.060) (1.720) (0.100) (5.415) (3.416) 
Contact BDO -0.407 0.778*** 0.025 -4.678 -7.597 -0.367 -38.132 0.250 18.136 -126.937 
(0.263) (0.196) (0.140) (7.364) (13.366) (0.244) (45.460) (0.499) (42.221) (137.387) 
Constant 
0.003 2.455*** 0.421*** 8.308*** 58.203*** 0.413*** 45.032*** 3.415*** 9.986 18.497*** 
(0.029) (0.053) (0.012) (0.293) (1.518) (0.068) (2.055) (0.127) (7.239) (5.584) 
Observations 286 286 286 286 286 286 285 276 286 286 
R-squared 0.117 0.412 0.330 0.364 0.614 0.436 0.448 0.579 0.481 0.475 
Number of GPs 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 138 143 143 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text. 
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by village) in parentheses.  
‘Contact BDO’ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when a president’s contact with the BDO is “high.” Here, “high” contact means the president stated they were 
in contact ‘sometimes’ or “frequently” with the BDO and “low” contact means the president replied “low” or “never.” 
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.1 
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Appendix 
A1: The GP Knowledge Test 
The 19 questions asked of every GP president in our survey are given below. 
1. Which Amendment recognizes the village panchayat as local self-government? 
2. What is the reservation percentage for women in the new panchayat act? 
3. How many tiers does the local self-government have? 
4. Does the district collector have the power to dissolve the village panchayat? 
5. If the village panchayat is dissolved, within what time limit should an election be conducted? 
6. Who has the power to remove the panchayat president? 
7. What is the minimum population required for a village panchayat? 
8. Who advises the state government on the release and allocation of funds to the panchayat? 
9. What is the minimum and maximum number of members in a village panchayat? 
10. If no women participants are elected in the village panchayat, how does the selection of 
women members take place? 
11. How many sub-committees are formed in the village panchayat? 
12. Which committee is responsible for the planning of the district as a whole? 
13. What is the tenure of the village panchayat? 
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14. The panchayat audit is done by whom? 
15. What is the minimum percentage of attendance required for conducting the village Gram 
Sabha meeting? 
16. How many times should the village Gram Sabha meeting be conducted in a year? 
17. How will you inform the public regarding the village Gram Sabha meeting? 
18. Who initiates the resolution during the village Gram Sabha meeting: president/vice 
president/village people? 
19. What is the maximum amount a panchayat can utilize for village development works without 
any permission from higher officials? 
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A2: The Public Goods Measures 
Eight (of the top 11) public goods mentioned in the citizen survey are listed on the left, with the 
corresponding public goods data used in our analysis on the right.  
Drinking Water: Number of borewells; Number of common taps 
Health/Hospital: Composite measurea of the percentage of children given 
immunizations for DPT, BCG, OPV, Measles, Tetanus-Toxoid 
Roads: Distance to nearest concrete road (in kilometers) 
School/Education: Number of schools 
Sanitation: Number of public toilets 
Buses: Number of bus & minibus trips 
Individual Pipeline/ Number of households with a drinking water connection; 
Toilet Connection: Number of households with a toilet 
Streetlights: Number of operational streetlights 
 
 
a The ‘composite measure’ is a weighted average of all of the factors listed in the group.  The weighted values were 
calculated using a factor analysis procedure. 
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Supplemental Appendix 
Appendix S1: Supplementary Tables  
Table S1.1: Correlation between Female-to-Total Population Ratio and Village Characteristics 
1991 Values Correlation 
Village population - total -0.31 
Female population -0.26 
Ratio of females to total population 1.00 
Scheduled Caste (SC) population -0.21 
Households total -0.30 
Hindu households -0.31 
Muslim households 0.07 
Christian households 0.05 
Farm households -0.24 
Total land (acres) -0.21 
Village citizens working in village -0.26 
Female village citizens working in village -0.23 
Literates -0.29 
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Table S1.2: All Responses from Villagers to the Question “What infrastructure is most needed?” 
Infrastructure Responses from  Men 
Responses from  
Women 
Bank 1 1 
Bridges 2 0 
Buses 55 53 
Community hall 3 2 
Companies and Industries 17 15 
Drainage 47 49 
Drinking water (borewells, public/common taps) 77 84 
Electricity 2 0 
Employment 0 2 
Graveyard 1 1 
Group houses 21 21 
Health/Hospitals 64 61 
Independent pipeline/toilet connections 10 15 
Internet 1 0 
Library 5 7 
Market facility 3 4 
No Comment 112 110 
Other* 1 3 
Pipelines 2 1 
Playground 0 1 
Post Office 1 0 
Ration Cards shops 1 1 
Roads 84 77 
Sanitation 38 27 
Schools/Education 51 37 
SHG (self-help group) building 3 6 
Streetlights 15 11 
Veterinary services 12 2 
Sample Size: 139 men, 131 women.  
* “Other” refers to difficult-to-categorize responses from individuals. 
Note: Individuals could list up to five items of infrastructure they felt were most needed in their village.  
While they were not prevented from giving the same response more than once, our analysis does not 
count repeat-responses from the same individual. 
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Table S1.3: Chi-Square Test of Preference Distribution by Gender 
 
Note: we use the top 11 responses instead of 10 because “Streetlights” and  
“Independent pipeline/toilet connections” are essentially tied. 
 All Responses Top 11 Responses 
  Men Women Men Women 
Bank 1 1     
Bridges 2 0   
Buses 55 53 55 53 
Community hall 3 2   
Companies & 
Industries 17 15 17 15 
Drainage 47 49 47 49 
Drinking water 77 84 77 84 
Electricity 2 0   
Employment 0 2   
Graveyard 1 1   
Group houses 21 21 21 21 
Health/Hospitals 64 61 64 61 
Independent 
pipeline/toilet 
connections 
10 15 10 15 
Internet 1 0   
Library 5 7   
Market facility 3 4   
Other 3 3   
Pipelines 2 1   
Playground 0 1   
Post Office 1 0   
Ration Card shops 1 1   
Roads 84 77 84 77 
Sanitation 38 27 38 27 
Schools/Education 51 37 51 37 
SHG building 3 6   
Streetlights 15 11 15 11 
Veterinary 
Services 12 2     
 Pearson chi
2=  23.331 
Pr = 0.614 
Pearson chi2 = 5.689 
Pr = 0.841 
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Table S1.4: Individual Tests of Preferences by Gender (percent of group listing each item)  
Response Men Women Difference 
Bank 0.007 0.008 0.000 
    0.010 
Bridges 0.014 0 0.014 
    0.010 
Buses 0.396 0.405 -0.009 
    0.060 
Community hall 0.022 0.015 0.006 
    0.016 
Companies/Industries 0.122 0.115 0.008 
    0.040 
Drainage 0.338 0.374 -0.036 
    0.058 
Drinking water 0.554 0.641 -0.087 
    0.061 
Electricity 0.014 0.000 0.014 
    0.010 
Employment 0 0.015 -0.015 
    0.010 
Graveyard 0.007 0.008 0.000 
    0.010 
Group houses 0.151 0.160 -0.009 
    0.044 
Health/Hospital 0.460 0.466 -0.005 
    0.061 
Individual pipeline or 
toilet connection 
0.072 0.115 -0.043 
    0.035 
Internet 0.007 0 0.007 
    0.007 
Library 0.036 0.053 -0.017 
    0.025 
Market facility 0.022 0.031 -0.009 
    0.019 
Other 0.022 0.023 -0.001 
    0.018 
Pipelines 0.014 0.008 0.007 
    0.013 
Playground 0 0.008 -0.008 
    0.007 
Post Office 0.007 0 0.007 
    0.007 
Ration Card shops 0.007 0.008 0.000 
    0.010 
Roads 0.604 0.588 0.017 
    0.061 
Sanitation 0.273 0.206 0.067 
    0.052 
School/Education 0.367 0.282 0.084 
    0.057 
Self-Help Group building 0.022 0.046 -0.024 
    0.022 
Streetlights 0.108 0.084 0.024 
    0.036 
Veterinary services 0.086 0.015 0.071*** 
    0.027 
Standard errors are given in italics. Significant at ***1%. 
Bold numbers represent the top 11 mentioned items.  Of these top 11 items, we investigate eight in our public goods analysis; we do not look at 
‘drainage,’ ‘group houses,’ and ‘companies and industries.’  We do not have good data on ‘drainage’ and ‘group houses’ and the GP president 
does not have control over ‘companies and industries.’ 
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Table S1.5: DID with Covariates, excluding experienced presidents 
 
 
Health 
(Composite 
Measure) 
Schools 
Distance (km) 
to Nearest 
Concrete 
Road 
Bus and 
Minibus 
Trips 
Streetlights Public Toilets 
Common 
Taps 
Number of 
Borewells 
HH Toilet 
Connection 
HH 
Drinking 
Water 
Connection 
Woman 
Res*2005 
-0.143 -0.914*** 0.122* 2.166 -10.207 0.283 14.256 0.507 -65.839*** -73.090** 
(0.177) (0.278) (0.072) (1.371) (8.699) (0.435) (15.206) (0.843) (24.071) (30.029) 
2005 
-3.932 -8.127** 0.817 -36.767** -2.932 -6.894 37.774 -13.166 -234.741 -649.886 
(2.561) (3.786) (0.825) (16.212) (163.613) (6.947) (191.674) (8.391) (291.507) (524.057) 
# Vills in GP -0.022 0.042* 0.009 0.274* -0.173 -0.016 0.148 0.105* -6.716*** -3.930 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.008) (0.144) (1.059) (0.046) (1.119) (0.061) (2.565) (3.073) 
SC Pop Ratio 
(1991) 
0.863** 0.877 0.138 -3.196 -15.311 -0.837 -8.120 1.177 115.594* 104.630 
(0.400) (1.245) (0.176) (3.335) (19.144) (0.914) (25.627) (1.703) (58.873) (91.578) 
Female Pop 
Ratio (1991) 
9.515 9.669 0.148 35.712 -52.946 10.122 -322.103 8.991 -914.032 247.652 
(5.792) (5.904) (1.316) (28.957) (274.483) (9.638) (319.791) (13.339) (618.876) (838.933) 
AIADMK 
Party 
0.223* 0.378 0.006 1.441 13.525** 0.014 17.434* 0.118 38.943* 33.684 
(0.125) (0.231) (0.059) (1.207) (5.462) (0.368) (8.879) (0.519) (22.893) (21.416) 
Log Total Pop 
(1991) 
-0.155 0.845*** -0.104** 0.485 4.022 -0.140 3.497 0.848* 90.162*** 62.902*** 
(0.186) (0.235) (0.045) (1.009) (5.903) (0.321) (10.471) (0.447) (24.036) (19.746) 
Log Total Land 
(1991) 
0.107 -0.426** -0.049 1.184 1.752 0.398 12.387 0.451 18.506 13.813 
(0.120) (0.190) (0.038) (1.258) (9.100) (0.389) (9.362) (0.429) (18.712) (19.363) 
Test Score 0.012 -0.044 0.017* 0.327 0.851 0.147** 0.727 0.064 -9.970** -4.787 
(0.020) (0.046) (0.009) (0.204) (1.650) (0.074) (1.965) (0.108) (3.891) (3.873) 
Contact BDO 
-0.712*** 0.856*** -0.185*** 4.754*** 13.933** -0.163 19.431* -0.056 70.053*** 84.055*** 
(0.121) (0.250) (0.054) (1.687) (6.780) (0.359) (10.897) (0.755) (26.138) (26.215) 
Constant 
0.062* 2.315*** 0.426*** 7.520*** 55.669*** 0.449*** 40.025*** 3.402*** 11.189** 20.591*** 
(0.031) (0.058) (0.013) (0.284) (1.453) (0.075) (2.137) (0.129) (5.012) (5.444) 
Observations 254 254 254 254 254 254 253 244 254 254 
R-squared 0.143 0.413 0.268 0.396 0.617 0.431 0.445 0.573 0.535 0.437 
Number of GPs 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 122 127 127 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
“Contact BDO” is a dummy variable where “high” contact is if the president stated they were in contact “sometimes” or “frequently” and “low” contact is 
if presidents replied “low” or “never.” 
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Appendix S2: Calculation of Errors in GP Women’s Reservations 
Recall that reservations in Tamil Nadu are made at the block level.  Thus, to recreate which GPs 
should have been reserved from 1996-2006, one needs the female population ratios for all GPs in 
the three blocks in our sample.  However, village-level population data collected in the Census 
do not 100 percent correspond to the composition of all GPs; our population data come directly 
from GP records.  Therefore, we can only estimate the errors in reservation status by establishing 
whether the GPs in our sample conform to the Tamil Nadu reservation policy: after removing 
GPs with an SC reservation, are the remaining 117 GPs in our sample reserved such that GPs in 
the 66.67 percentile of female population ratios in their block received a reservation and the 
others did not?  We estimate that 14 GPs had an erroneous reservation status. 
 
 Did not have reservation Had reservation 
Should not have reservation 74 6 
Should have reservation 8 29 
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Appendix S3: Regression Discontinuity Design 
Because Tamil Nadu uses population ratios to assign reservations to GPs, a regression 
discontinuity (RD) approach would be ideal for identifying the effect of reservations on 
differences in public goods provision.  However, the nature of Tamil Nadu’s reservations 
requires that we omit GPs with SC reservations in an RD analysis, since women’s reservations 
were based on female population ratios after SC reservations had been determined.28  
Additionally, because RD involves examining only GPs around the discontinuity, the resulting 
sample size is small.  Thus, we pursue a simple RD analysis as a supplemental inquiry into our 
main findings.   
Out of 117 remaining GPs that did not have a reservation for SC, we estimate that 14 GPs 
had an erroneous women’s reservation: six GPs with a reservation for a female GP president 
should have been unreserved and eight GPs with unreserved president seats should have had a 
reservation for a woman (see Appendix S2).  Therefore, we pursue a fuzzy RD design.29   
Figures S3.1 and S3.2 show the results of a basic fuzzy RD analysis.  The x-axis of all the 
figures indicates whether GPs are above or below the cutoff female population ratio for 
reservations in their block; GPs above zero should be reserved and GPs below zero should not.  
The y-axis indicates reservation status in Figure S3.1; in Figure S3.2, it measures the change in 
each public goods measure from 1991 to 2005.   
Population ratios strongly determine whether a GP received a reservation (Figure S3.1) 
and the RD analysis is generally supportive of our DID findings (Figure S3.2).  In particular, the 
28 We need village-level population data for all GPs in each block to do a full RD analysis. We were unable to attain 
this data due to differences in how the Census measures village-level population and how GPs are actually formed.  
Our population data come directly from GP office records. 
29 Sharp RD is when a threshold value clearly defines the treated and untreated, with no crossovers.  Fuzzy RD is 
used when there is a high probability of being treated or untreated based on which side of the threshold value an 
observation falls, but that probability is not equal to one. 
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“jump” at the discontinuity shown in the top right graph (Figure S3.2) indicates that fewer 
schools were added in women-reserved GPs.  None of the discontinuities is statistically 
significant, as shown in Table S3.1, though the large standard errors are likely due to the small 
sample size.  (One exception is public toilets in the small bandwidth estimates, but this is likely 
due to a high-leverage observation in the very small sample size.) 
 
Figure S3.1: Reservations and RD (bin width==0.005) 
 
Note: Values below zero indicate GPs that should not have been reserved (they were below the 66.67 
percentile ‘cutoff’ female population ratio).  Those above zero should have been reserved. Our 117 GPs 
have been lumped into equally sized groups by choosing a binwidth and on the y-axis we see the ‘average’ 
reservation value of that bin.  Those with y=0 and y=1 indicate all GPs in that bin had the same 
reservation status.  Values in-between illustrate the reservation errors.  However, we clearly see that, 
overall, GPs below the cutoff were not reserved and those above the cutoff were reserved. 
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Figure S3.2: RD Graphs by Outcome Variable (bin width = 0.005)   
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(Figure S3.2, continued) 
  
  
Note: These graphs were constructed by omitting outliers—i.e., GPs with female-population ratios more 
than four percent higher or four percent lower than the 66.67 percentile cutoff—and estimating a linear 
regression line on each side of the cutoff. 
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Table S3.1: Estimates of Discontinuities 
  
Health 
(Composite 
Measure) 
Schools 
Distance 
(km) to 
Nearest 
Concrete 
Road 
Bus and 
Minibus 
Trips 
Streetlights Public Toilets 
Common 
Taps 
Number 
of 
Borewells 
HH Toilet 
Connection 
HH 
Drinking 
Water 
Connection 
Bandwidth=0.005 
         
 
-0.365 -0.786 -0.160 -0.454 -7.670 1.886** -7.090 1.204 -26.548 -37.528 
 
(0.553) (0.814) (0.238) (3.637) (12.220) (0.764) (23.190) (1.856) (82.580) (45.965) 
N 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 36 39 39 
Bandwidth=0.050 
         
 
-0.371 -0.433 -0.074 0.022 -12.691 0.018 2.178 0.603 0.534 -39.534 
 
(0.240) (0.423) (0.102) (2.352) (12.493) (0.556) (14.905) (0.868) (68.254) (39.591) 
N 116 116 116 116 116 116 115 111 116 116 
Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.05 
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